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Abstract 
The introduction of the Family Home Protection Act 1976 (the “1976 Act”) was a significant 
development in the protection of the family home in Ireland. However, an important lacuna has 
emerged in its coverage in light of its inapplicability to judgment mortgages registered over the 
family home. On the Tenth anniversary of the Law Reform Commission’s Consultation Paper on 
Judgment Mortgages, this article draws on the most up-to-date data to highlight the seriousness of 
this shortcoming. It investigates the vulnerability of non-debtor spouses where a judgment mortgage 
is registered over the family home and questions what reforms may be introduced to better achieve 
the objectives of the 1976 Act in such circumstances.  
Introduction 
In the mid-1970s, Senator Mary Robinson remarked: “Probably the source of greatest hardship in 
our family law has been the helplessness and the dependence of the wife who could not prevent the 
matrimonial home from being sold over her head.”1 In response to this threat, the Commission on 
the Status of Women proposed the introduction of a system whereby a spouse’s ability to 
unilaterally dispose of the matrimonial home was restricted.2 This proposal, modified and extended 
by the legislature, was subsequently brought to fruition through the Family Home Protection Act 
1976.3 Although initially conceived as a means of protecting non-owning spouses in the family home, 
particularly wives, the objective of the legislation has since been stated in broader terms. Blayney J. 
for the Supreme Court in Bank of Ireland v Smyth noted that the Act's protection of the home was 
for the benefit of the family as a whole and not merely for the dependent spouse.4 Similarly, in 
Dunne v Hamilton the court observed, “The Act provides for the protection of the family home, 
presumably as an implementation of the constitutional duty that falls on the State to protect the 
family and to guard with special care the institution of marriage.”5 
The main source of protection afforded by the 1976 Act arises under s.3, which requires, subject to 
certain exceptions, the written consent of the non-owning spouse6 for the conveyance of any 
interest in the family home.7 This consent must, (a) be made prior to the conveyance; (b) be in 
writing; and (c) be valid. To be valid, it must be “free” and “fully informed”8 and the burden of 
proving this standard rests with the person seeking to rely on the consent. Moreover, an extensive 
array of inter vivos transactions is directly affected by the 1976 Act. A conveyance under s.3 includes 
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a mortgage, lease, assent transfer, disclaimer, release and any other disposition of property 
otherwise than by will or by donatio mortis causa. The definition of conveyance also includes an 
enforceable agreement, whether conditional or unconditional, to make any such conveyance. In 
light of its comprehensive nature, Minister Cooney, the then Minister for Justice, noted in Dáil 
Éireann in 1976: “It is an unavoidable consequence that from now on the consent of the wife will be 
required in all cases of the sale of the family home.”9 
However, an important lacuna in the legislation has emerged vis-à-vis judgment mortgages which 
seriously compromises the effectiveness of the 1976 Act in achieving its objective. In light of the 
decision in Containercare Ireland Ltd v Wycherley,10 it is clear section 3 consent is not required in 
situations where a judgment mortgage is registered against a family home.  
On the Tenth anniversary of the Law Reform Commission’s Consultation Paper on Judgment 
Mortgages 2004,11 this article once again places the focus squarely on the difficulties posed by 
judgment mortgages. Drawing on the most up-to-date statistical data, it highlights the increasing 
prevalence of judgment mortgages in Ireland and, in particular, the specific threat they pose to the 
family home. The article investigates the extent to which non-debtor spouses remain vulnerable 
where a judgment mortgage is registered over the family home and what reforms may be 
introduced to protect such spouses. Finally, the article examines why the proposals contained in the 
2004 Consultation Paper have not been introduced to date and renews the call for reform. 
A Shortcoming Emerges 
Rejecting the proposition that a judgment mortgage which had been registered without the prior 
consent of the non-owning spouse was void under the 1976 Act, in Containercare Ireland Ltd v 
Wycherley, Carroll J. held: “[A] judgment mortgage is a process of execution.... A judgment 
mortgage, if registered against a family home, is not a disposition by a spouse purporting to convey 
an interest in the family home. It is a unilateral act by a judgment creditor … it cannot be construed 
as a conveyance by a spouse.”12 This approach was confirmed by Barrington J. in Murray v Diamond:  
“I do not think that the mere fact that a man has irresponsibly allowed himself to get into 
debt, or allowed a judgment to be obtained against him and thereby allowed a situation to 
develop in which his creditor registers a judgment against his interest in the family home, 
would justify a court in saying that he has conveyed or purported to convey his interest in 
the family home to the judgment mortgagee.”13 
A judgment mortgage, he held, comes into existence by operation of law. Although the Supreme 
Court in Bank of Ireland v Purcell14 “dropped a heavy hint that it disapproved of the idea that 
judgment mortgages were not covered by the Family Home Protection Act 1976”,15 this remains the 
reality. As a result, the situation may be summarised thus:  
“[I]f a husband incurs business or other debts for which he is personally liable, while he 
cannot raise money to discharge such debts by mortgaging the home without his wife's co-
operation, where the debts are not discharged and a judgment is obtained against him for 
the money due, a judgment creditor may register the judgment against the husband's 
interest in the home and then bring an application before the courts to seek an order for 
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sale to enforce payment of the monies due to him out of the husband's share of the 
proceeds realised from any such sale of the home.”16 
The difficulty presented by the emergence of this legislative gap has long been acknowledged. 
Almost 30 years ago, the Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Marriage Breakdown 
recommended “legislative action should be taken immediately in order to prevent the spirit of the 
[1976] Act being defeated whereby judgment mortgages can be used to secure the sale of the family 
home without the consent of either or both spouses”.17 No action followed. Exactly 10 years ago, in 
2004, the Law Reform Commission’s Consultation Paper on Judgment Mortgages was published. It 
noted that while no specific statistical data was available, it seemed “reasonable to assume that a 
significant proportion of judgment mortgages” were registered against family homes.18 In light of the 
difficulties in the area, it too recommended reform of the law governing judgment mortgages and 
the family home. Again, no legislative action was forthcoming.19  
In the meantime, however, the number of judgment mortgages filed in Ireland has increased 
dramatically year on year. While 367 judgment mortgage affidavits were filed in the High Court in 
2004,20 3,075 judgment mortgage certificates, which since December 1, 2009, replace judgment 
mortgage affidavits, were filed in the High Court in 2012—a staggering increase of more than 800 
per cent.21 Similarly, although the earliest statistical data on the frequency of judgment mortgage 
affidavits filed in the Circuit Court originates from 2007, this too shows a considerable increase. 
While 1,266 such affidavits were filed in the Circuit Court in 2007,22 this figure more than trebled by 
2012 when 4,375 judgment mortgage certificates were filed.23  
Moreover, although not all judgment mortgages filed in the High Court or the Circuit Court are 
ultimately registered against property, a large proportion is.24 While the Law Reform Commission 
reported 1,779 judgment mortgages were registered in the Land Registry and the Registry of Deeds 
in 2003,25 this figure has since increased by more than 450 per cent with 8,097 judgment mortgages 
registered in the Land Registry and the Registry of Deeds in 2013.26 Although, like the Law Reform 
Commission, this author was unable to obtain statistical data on the issue, it remains “reasonable to 
assume” a considerable proportion of these judgment mortgages continue to be registered against 
family homes throughout the country.  
Therefore the question arises: In light of the inapplicability of the 1976 Act, how vulnerable is an 
“innocent” spouse to the sale of a family home where a judgment mortgage is registered over the 
property and what can be done to make their position more secure, thereby better achieving the 
core objective of the 1976 Act in such circumstances? 
The Vulnerability of “Innocent”, Non-debtor, Spouses and Avenues for Reform 
Where a judgment mortgage is registered over a family home, the vulnerability of an innocent, non-
debtor, spouse depends to some extent on how ownership of the property is held.  
The vulnerability of an innocent, non-debtor, co-owning spouse 
Until very recently, where a judgment mortgage was registered against a co-owner’s interest in a 
family home, a judgment creditor was required to seek an order for the sale of the entire property 
under the Partition Acts 1868 and 1876 in order to enforce their security. Pursuant to s.4 of the 
Partition Act 1868, where the co-owner who requested the sale was entitled to a 50 per cent share 
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or more in the ownership of the property, the court could not, in the absence of “good reason to the 
contrary”, refuse to award a sale of the property and a division of the proceeds.27 In such 
circumstances, therefore, it appeared there was a strong presumption in favour of sale.28 
Notwithstanding this, however, First National Building Society v Ring appeared to throw an 
important lifeline to vulnerable, non-debtor, co-owning spouses by indicating that an order for sale 
may not automatically be made against the property upon an application by a judgment creditor 
under the Partition Acts.29  
Ring concerned a creditor who registered a judgment mortgage against a family home on foot of a 
judgment obtained against the husband for £160,000. While the wife did not possess a right of veto 
under the 1976 Act, Denham J. considered the fact that the property in question was a family home 
was a relevant factor which ought to be considered by the court when deciding whether or not to 
exercise its discretion to refuse a sale under s.4 of the Partition Act 1868. Having considered the 
particular facts of the case, Denham J. concluded: “The second defendant who is a co-owner and 
who is an innocent party and has no judgment registered against her would undoubtedly suffer a 
significant sacrifice if her property, part of the family home, were now sold. In these circumstances it 
does not appear appropriate now to order partition or sale in lieu of partition.”30  
Notwithstanding that the importance and strength of the precedent became a source of some 
confusion,31 Laffoy J. again referred to Ring in the 2010 High Court decision of Trinity College v Kenny 
and distinguished the facts in Ring from the facts at hand.32 Considering an application seeking an 
order for sale of the family home pursuant to a judgment mortgage, the court found that the couple, 
in their seventies, would be in a position to purchase alternative accommodation for themselves 
with the balance of the proceeds of sale once the debt was repaid. The court also observed that the 
couple’s five adult children had all left home. Notwithstanding that there would be a “degree of 
disruption to their lives”, an order for sale was, therefore, granted.33 
The decisions in Ring and Trinity College appeared to establish that where a family home was used 
as security, a judgment creditor was not conferred with an automatic entitlement to an order for 
sale of the property upon the registration of his interest in it—whether such a request was granted, 
depended on the facts of the case.34 Moreover, it is suggested that, although the situations were by 
no means the same, such an approach was in keeping with the decision of O’D v O’D.35 Here, it was 
established that a co-owning spouse could benefit from the protection afforded by the Family Home 
Protection Act 1976 in an action under the Partition Acts 1868 and 1876. Murphy J. held that what 
constituted “good reason to the contrary” within the meaning of s.4 of the Partition Act 186836 
should “properly have regard to the rights of parties under the Family Home Protection Act 1976”.37  
Today, however, the Partition Acts have been repealed and replaced by the Land and Conveyancing 
Law Reform Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”). As a result, a judgment mortgagee must now apply for an 
order for sale pursuant to s.31 of the 2009 Act. Does the apparent authority of Ring continue to hold 
good? It appears it might.38 Furthermore, although there may have been doubts about the strength 
of its precedent, it is certainly arguable that the introduction of the 2009 Act leaves the door ajar for 
the approach in Ring to be developed on more solid footing.39  
Admittedly, on one hand, it has been argued that the 2009 Act removes the framework for judicial 
discretion as previously existed under the Partition Acts 1868 and 1876 “and replaces it with an 
entirely open-ended regime where the co-owner has no certainty of being able to bring the co-
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ownership to an end and no criteria are mentioned to guide the court” thereby affording the 
judiciary “untrammelled discretion”.40 While this is clearly a concern, on the other hand, it could 
present an opportunity for the positive development of the law in relation to judgment mortgages. 
As Conway notes: 
“[T]he new statutory jurisdiction under s.31 is more flexible than that under the Partition 
Acts, where the court’s discretion was usually restricted to making an order for either 
partition or sale and the difficulties formerly associated with the former remedy usually 
created a strong presumption in favour of the latter. This may have some bearing on the 
final outcome”.41  
Moreover, it is contended the development of an approach akin to that adopted in Ring would not 
be unduly unfair to third party creditors. Unlike other jurisdictions such as England and Wales where 
an “overarching pro-creditor position” has been observed,42 the protection of the family home in 
Ireland is clearly prioritised in line with Art.41 of Bunreacht na hÉireann which “aspires to protect 
the home as the seat of the family”.43 In light of both the legislative and judicial development of the 
law in this area, mortgagees who hold the family home as security ought to be acutely aware of the 
high level of protection afforded to the property. It is arguable that they ought to be alert to the 
special nature of the home and the fact that it may constitute a riskier form of security in 
comparison to other types of premises. 
Furthermore, in considering other methods of circumventing the difficulties posed by the lacuna in 
the 1976 Act where a judgment creditor seeks an order for sale of a co-owned family home, 
Professor Mee also raises an interesting possibility.44 He suggests that a judgment debtor could 
arguably avail of his right of veto under the 1976 Act where a judgment creditor, having obtained a 
court order for the sale of the property, conveys the husband’s own share of the family home to a 
purchaser and then requires the wife to also convey her interest in the home to the purchaser. This 
conveyance by the wife, he argues, falls within the scope of s.3(1) of the 1976 Act and, therefore, 
necessitates the prior written consent of the husband which he could, theoretically, refuse. Mee 
explains that the “right of veto is a valuable, independent right. It arises in the husband, not because 
of his own property rights over the home, but because of his wife’s ownership of a share in the 
home.”45 
Assessing the merit of this possibility, Conway suggests that “while it seems wrong in principle” that 
a spouse who has incurred a debt precipitating the registration of a judgment mortgage against the 
family home should be able to utilise a protection which was introduced with the intention of 
protecting an “innocent” spouse, this use of the Act would correlate with the “ethos” of the 
legislation which is focused on ensuring the protection of the family home.46 Despite this view, 
however, it is submitted that even where a husband refuses to give his consent in such a scenario, 
there is a high probability that the court is likely to dispense with the consent under s.4 of the 1976 
Act.47 
The vulnerability of an innocent, non-debtor, non-owning spouse 
Where a family home is not co-owned, either at law or in equity, non-owning spouses appear to be 
especially vulnerable to the registration of a judgment mortgage and, in due course, a court order 
for the sale of the premises.48 On the basis of Carroll J.’s decision in Containercare, it seems that 
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where a judgment mortgage is registered against the family home an order for sale should be made 
where no beneficial interest accrues to the non-debtor spouse.49 What solutions can, therefore, be 
presented to reduce the helplessness of such spouses?  
One obvious means of improving the situation for a potentially wide cohort of non-owning spouses 
is to better facilitate such spouses becoming co-owners in equity. The equitable remedy of choice in 
the Irish courts for disputes regarding the beneficial ownership of the family home is the purchase 
money resulting trust. Since its first application in Heavey v Heavey,50 the purchase money resulting 
trust affords non-owning spouses the ability to generate an equitable interest in the family home 
through direct or indirect contributions. It has been established that direct contributions to the 
purchase price of a property, whether in an outright purchase or financed by mortgage repayments, 
generate a beneficial interest.51 Moreover, both contributions to a family fund while a mortgage is 
being repaid52 and contributions through unpaid work in the homeowner’s business shall also give 
rise to a successful claim for a beneficial interest in the home.53  
Unfortunately, however, other very valuable indirect contributions do not presently generate a 
beneficial interest. In particular, it is widely considered that the failure to recognise unpaid work in 
the home as capable of generating a beneficial interest represents the single greatest weakness in 
the purchase money resulting trust.54 If the purchase money resulting trust was reformed to give 
recognition to unpaid domestic contributions, this would allow many more spouses to avail of the 
apparent precedent in Ring where a judgment mortgage is registered against the family home.55 
Nevertheless, as de Londras observes: 
“To say that courts ought to step in and realise socio-economic rights – such as ownership 
rights for financially disenfranchised stay-at-home mothers and house-wives – is not, as 
Gerry Whyte has noted, ‘to say that they should be first into the fray. There are good 
institutional reasons why we should look initially to the legislative and executive branches 
for protection of such rights ... the courts should only be used as a last resort, when it is clear 
that the political process is incapable of protecting the right in question’.”56 
Shatter suggested the amendment of s.36 of the Family Law Act 1995 to provide that the 
contribution made by both spouses to the welfare of the family would be deemed a contribution in 
money or money’s worth capable of generating a beneficial interest in the family home.57 He also 
recommended that the “artificial distinction” between contributions to the acquisition of property 
and the improvement of property should be removed.58 These recommendations did receive some 
support from the Law Reform Commission in its 2004 Consultation Paper on the Rights and Duties of 
Cohabitees:  
“Shatter’s proposals are attractive in that they do not necessitate any radical change in the 
existing law. They also have the added advantage that third parties would not be unduly 
disadvantaged as it would be as difficult to predict whether an interest was acquired by 
means of unpaid work within the home as opposed to unpaid work outside the home. The 
interests of prospective purchasers or mortgagors could be protected by the creation of a 
new requisition on title dealing with the matter.”59 
However, although these recommendations undoubtedly have merit, their implementation may 
create more problems than they would solve. First, despite Shatter’s claims to the contrary, the 
7 
 
quantification and valuation of unpaid work in the home would be difficult.60 Secondly, the 
recommendations would not assist spouses who made pre- or post-acquisition contributions. This 
was highlighted as a key weakness by the Law Reform Commission. As a result, it noted: “While the 
rules governing the purchase money resulting trust could be amended to consider such 
contributions ... to do so would be to force property law to solve what is essentially a family law 
problem.”61 
One approach which would avoid these weaknesses is the reintroduction of an amended version of 
the Matrimonial Home Bill 1993. Section 4 of the 1993 Bill provided that where a spouse was the 
sole owner of the matrimonial home on the commencement date, or became a sole owner 
thereafter, the beneficial interest in the property would vest in both spouses as joint tenants. 
Despite this, the Supreme Court unanimously found the Bill to be unconstitutional as it infringed on 
the authority of the family.62 In particular, the retrospective application of the legislation proved to 
be its downfall.  Nevertheless, a number of academics have suggested that such legislation could be 
reintroduced without constitutional question provided its application is limited to prospective 
effect.63 Although this reintroduction would undoubtedly be a welcome improvement in the law, it 
would have to be part of a wider reform of matrimonial property law. As Woods notes: “If ... the 
reintroduced Bill only applied to a matrimonial home purchased by a spouse after the 
commencement date, it could be argued that this would unfairly discriminate against the non-
owning spouse whose matrimonial home had been acquired before the commencement date.”64 
Therefore, the reintroduction of the amended Bill would have to be in conjunction with reform on 
the basis of Shatter’s proposals for the development of the purchase money resulting trust. Despite 
the respective weaknesses of both proposals, the combined effect of these reforms would certainly 
provide much better protection for otherwise non-owning spouses. 
Unfortunately, however, although de Londras notes it is “somewhat surprising” that no government 
has proposed a community of property scheme since the failure of the Matrimonial Home Bill,65 it is 
unlikely whether such reform will, in fact, be forthcoming in the near future. The legislature seems 
to demonstrating signs of “Once bitten, twice shy”. Indeed, even if the proposals were introduced, 
not all non-owning spouses would be able to avail of the protection they afford.66 Alternative 
solutions must, therefore, be considered.  
Advancing a partial solution in 1997, both in cases of sole-ownership and co-ownership, Shatter 
proposed that, whether or not legal or equitable co-ownership exists, s.5 of the 1976 Act could be 
modified to ensure the protection of the family home against the registration of a judgment 
mortgage. Currently, pursuant to s.5, the court is empowered to transfer the family home to the 
non-owning spouse where the owner spouse is engaging in conduct which may lead to the loss of 
the property. An order to protect the family home under s.5 may only be made, however, where 
there is evidence that the owner spouse is engaging in such conduct with an intention to deprive the 
applicant spouse of their residence in the family home.67 Crucially, therefore, the conduct concerned 
must represent a deliberate attempt to lose, or actually have resulted in the loss of, such an 
interest.68 In this regard, it has been noted, “[t]he intention requirement has been strictly applied, 
sometimes in a way that causes real difficulties”69 and evidence of carelessness or irresponsibility is 
insufficient. Moreover, as Lyall notes, cases in which an order under s.5 are made “do not, 




“This ad hoc approach, has the tendency to undermine the potentially significant protective 
properties of s.5(1) ... for the simple reason that succeeding in such an application must 
inevitably be perceived as an unlikely eventuality and ... practitioners will be somewhat 
reluctant to advise their clients to claim under this section alone. Thus, while such 
applications may form part of a larger claim, it seems unlikely that the jurisprudence on 
s.5(1) is stable enough for a practitioner to be able to confidently advise a client as to its 
potential usefulness in an apposite case”.71  
To overcome these difficulties, Shatter recommended the amendment of s.5 to facilitate court 
orders transferring the entire ownership, or a share of it, from one spouse to the other, “without the 
applicant spouse having to prove that the spouse so behaving specifically intends that his or her 
conduct deprive the applicant spouse and/or dependent children of the family of their right to reside 
in the home”.72 Although de Londras describes this requirement of intention as a “counterbalance” 
to the “somewhat speculative nature of protecting against harm that has not yet accrued”,73 it is 
contended that in circumstances where the family home is clearly in danger of being lost due to the 
actions of the owning spouse, the balance of fairness should weigh in favour of intervention.74  
Again, however, although such law reform would appear to offer an effective solution on the 
simplest terms, difficulties would still remain. For instance, what if it is too late to get a section 5 
order and a judgment mortgage has already been registered against the property? In such 
circumstances, it is submitted that the implementation of the proposals contained in the Law 
Reform Commission’s 2004 Consultation Paper on Judgment Mortgages would represent a fair 
solution. It recommended that to protect the interests of a non-owning spouse, “no order for sale of 
a family home pursuant to a judgment mortgage should be possible unless the court so orders, 
having heard all the interested parties”.75 In this manner, it proposed that the situation arising on 
the registration of a judgment mortgage would more closely mirror s.61(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 
1988, which states: 
“Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in ss.(3), no disposition of 
property of a bankrupt, arranging debtor or person dying insolvent, which comprises a 
family home within the meaning of the Family Home Protection Act 1976, shall be made 
without the prior sanction of the Court, and any disposition made without such sanction 
shall be void.” 
The Law Reform Commission also suggested a principled approach to the exercise of the court’s 
discretion by laying down specific factors to which the court should have regard in determining 
whether to order a sale of the family home pursuant to a judgment mortgage.  
These principles included: 
 the financial means of the judgment creditor, the non-debtor owner and the family of the 
non-debtor owner residing in the property;  
 whether the sale of the property would generate sufficient funds to allow the non-debtor 
owner to purchase reasonably similar accommodation in the area;  
 the amount of the judgment mortgage as a proportion of the value of the property;  
 the ability of the judgment debtor to provide reasonable alternative accommodation from 
the proceeds of sale;  
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 and other matters which would seem relevant to the court.76  
Yet, notwithstanding their apparent simplicity and attractiveness, these proposals were not 
implemented by the provisions governing judgment mortgages included in the Land and 
Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009. Two factors appear to have influenced this omission. First, it 
was considered that it would be more appropriate to deal with this issue by amending the 1976 Act. 
Secondly, it was considered that the 2004 Law Reform Commission proposals were merely 
contributions to a consultation paper and the provisional recommendations had not followed 
normal procedure and been firmed up into a report before the project leading to the 2009 Act 
began.77 While the latter is, perhaps, a legitimate explanation, it could be easily overcome. However, 
the former excuse seems questionable. Extending the 1976 Act to include judgment mortgages is 
impractical. It is highly unlikely that a spouse would agree to the registration of a judgment 
mortgage. Moreover, although s.4 of the 1976 Act empowers the court to dispense with the consent 
of the non-owning spouse where it is “unreasonable” for the spouse to withhold such consent 
having regard to all the circumstances, where a judgment mortgage is registered against a family 
home such a refusal to consent could hardly be regarded as “unreasonable” in light of the negative 
consequences which would flow from such an action. Indeed, the Law Reform Commission noted, “it 
appears to us that imposing such a requirement would render the judgment mortgage procedure 
unworkable”.78  
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that an alternative approach adopted by some homestead provisions 
in the United States provides for the exemption, to a greater or lessor extent, of the family home 
from actions to recoup unsecured debts.79 Although a similar approach in Ireland would overcome 
the difficulties caused by the lacuna in relation to judgment mortgages and better achieve the 
objectives of the 1976 Act, it would be likely to give rise to considerable opposition from the 
commercial and lending sector, particularly in the current economic environment. As a result, a 
discretionary approach which seeks to better balance the interests of both third party creditors and 
non-debtor spouses appears preferable. As de Londras states, “What seems to be needed ... is a 
protection measure for the spouse ... at the point of the proposed enforcement of the judgment 
mortgage, as opposed to at the point of its creation.”80  
Conclusion 
The 1976 Act is considered a “remedial social statute” and the courts have vowed to interpret it “as 
widely and liberally as can fairly be done” to ensure the effectiveness of its measures.81 However, a 
serious gap has arisen in the statutory coverage which undermines the ability of the legislation to 
achieve its core objective, namely, “to protect the interests of the non-owning spouse and the 
family”.82 Indeed, the inapplicability of the legislation to judgment mortgages registered against the 
family home now represents the “main deficiency” of the Act.83 
In light of this “deficiency” and the resulting vulnerability of non-debtor spouses in the family home, 
this article has considered a number of avenues for reform. In particular, it is submitted the 
amendment of s.5 of the 1976 Act and the incorporation into law of the Law Reform Commission’s 
2004 proposals are viable solutions which would go a long way towards remedying the vulnerability 
of such spouses in the family home. Unfortunately, however, to date, no action has been taken and 
the failure of the legislature to include the 2004 proposals in the 2009 Act, is especially striking. The 
proposals seem to have been put on the back-burner indefinitely indicating a general disengagement 
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with the issue by the legislature which appears to view this lacuna in the 1976 Act somewhat 
benignly. Yet the shortcomings of the law in this respect are very real and ought to be recognised as 
such. In light of the recent economic turmoil there has been a dramatic increase in the registration 
of judgment mortgages in Ireland as evidenced in the statistical data reproduced above. As a result, 
the weakness in the protection afforded by the 1976 Act due to the legislative lacuna is now 
amplified. The legislature must act, sooner rather than later, to close this legislative gap and to 
achieve, more effectively, the objectives of the 1976 Act. 
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